Essaies.

Religious Meditations.

Places of perswasion and disswasion.

Seene and allowed.

Printed at London for Iohn Iaggard dwelling in Fleete-streete at the Hand and Starre neere Temple barre.
1612.

1 6 1 2.

Eſsaies.

1. Of ſtudie.
2. Of diſcourſe.
3. Of ceremonies, and reſpects.
4. Of followers and friends.
5. Of Sutors.
6. Of expence.
7. Of Regiment of health.
8. Of Honor aud reputation.
9. Of Faction.
10. Of Negociating.

5. Negociating.

To Maister Anthony Bacon
his deare Brother.

Ouing and beloued brother I do now like ſome that haue an Orcharde ill neighboured, that gather their fruit before it is ripe, to preuent ſtealing. Theſe fragments of my conceits were going to print: To labour the ſtay of them had beene troubleſome, and ſubiect to interpretation: to let them paſſe had bin to aduenter the wrong they might receiue by vntrue Coppies, or by ſome garniſhment which it might pleaſe any that ſhould ſet them forth to beſtow vpon them. Therefore I held it beſt diſcretion to publiſh them my ſelfe as they paſſed long agoe from my pen without any further diſgrace, then the weaknes of

the author. And as I did euer hold there might be as great a vanity in retyring and with-drawing mens conceits (except they be of some nature) from the world, as in obtruding them: So in these particulars I haue played my selfe the inquisitor, and find nothing to my vnderstanding in them contrary, or infectious to the state of Religion, or manners, but rather (as I suppose) medicinable. Onely I disliked now to put them out, because they will be like the late newe halfe-pence, which though the siluer were good, yet the pieces were small. But since they would not stay with their master, but would needs trauel abroad, I haue preferred them to you, that are next my selfe, dedicating them, such as they are, to our loue, in the

depth

depth whereof (I assure you) I sometimes wish your infirmities translated vpon my selfe, that her maiesty might haue the seruice of so actiue and able a mind, and I might bee with excuse confined to these contemplations and studies for which I am fittest, so commende I you to the preseruation of the diuine Maiestty. From my Chamber at Grayes Inne, this 30. of Ianuary. 1597.

Your entire loning brother
Francis Bacon.

ESSAIES.

Of Studies.

Tudies ſerue for paſtimes, for ornaments, and for abilities. Their chiefe vſe for paſtime is in priuateneſſe and retyring: for ornament is in diſcourſe, and for ability is in iudgement. For expert men can execute, but learned men are fitteſt to iudge or cenſure.

To ſpend too much time in them is ſloth, to vſe them too much for ornament is affectation: to make iudgement wholy by their rules, is the humor of a Scholler. They perfect *Nature*, and are perfected by experience. Crafty men contemne them, ſimple men admire them, and wiſe men vſe them: for they teach not their owne vſe, but that is a wiſedome without them: and aboue them, won by obſeruation. Read not to

tradict, nor to beleeue, but to weigh and consider. Some bookes are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some fewe to be chewed and disgested. That is, some bookes are to be read onely in parts: others to be read but cursorily, and some few to be read wholy and with diligence and atention Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man, and writing an exact man. And therefore if a man write little, he had need haue a great memory: if he conferre little, haue a present wit, and if he read little, he had neede haue much cunning to seeme to know that he doth not. Histories make men wise, Poets witty, the Mathematiks subtill, naturall philosophy deep, Morall graue, Logick and Rhetoricke, able to contend.

Of Discourse.

[illegible] in their discourse desire rather commendation of [illegible] in being

ing able to hold all arguments, then of iudgement in discerning what is true, as if it were a praise to know what might be said, & not what shold be thought. Some haue certaine cō-mon places and Theames wherein they are good, and want variety, which kind of pouerty is for the most part tedious, and now and then ridi-culous. The honorablest part of talke is to giue the occasion, and againe to moderate & passe to somewhat else. It is good to varry and mixe speech of the present occasion with argument, tales with reasons, asking of questiōs, with telling of opinions, and iest with earnest. But some things are priuiled-ged from iest, namely religion, mat-ters of state, great persons, any mans present businesse of importance, and any case that deserueth pitty. He that questioneth much shall learne much, and content much, specially if he ap-ply his question to the skill of the

person

ferſon of whom he asketh, for he ſhall giue them occaſion to pleaſe themſelues in ſpeaking, and himſelfe ſhall continually gather knowledge. If you diſſemble ſometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to know, you ſhall bee thought another time to know that you know not. Speech of a mans ſelfe is not good often, and there is but one caſe, wherein a man may commend himſelfe with good grace, & that is in commending vertue in another, eſpecially if it be ſuch a vertue, as where-unto himſelfe pretendeth. Diſcretion of ſpeech is more then eloquence, and to ſpeake agreeably to him, with whom we deale is more then to ſpeake in good words or in good order. A good continued ſpeech without a good ſpeech of interlocution ſheweth ſlownes: and a good reply or ſecond ſpeech without a good ſet ſpeech ſhewes ſlownes and weakeneſſe, as

beasts, that those that are weakest in the course are yet nimblest in the turne. To vse too many circumstances ere one come to the matter is wearisome, to vse none at al is blunt.

Of Ceremonies and Respects.

HE that is onely reall had neede haue exceeding great parts of vertue, as the stone had need be rich that is set without foyle. But commonly it is in praise as it is in gaine. For as the prouerbe is true, *That light gaines make heauy purses*: because they come thick, whereas great come but now & then, so it is as true that small matters win great commendation: because they are continually in vse and in note, whereas the occasion of anye great vertue commeth but on holy daies. To attaine good formes, it suffeeth not to despise them, [illegible] shal a man obserue thē in others [illegible]

let him trust himselfe with the rest, for if he care to expresse them hee shall leese their grace, which is to be naturall and vnaffected. Some mens behauior is like a verse wherin euery syllable is measured. How can a man cõprehend great matters that breaketh his minde too much to small obseruations? Not to vse Ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to vse them againe, and so diminish his respect, especially they be not to be omitted to strangers and strange natures. Amongst a mans pieres a man shall bee sure of familiarity, and therefore it is a good title to keepe state: among a mans inferiors one shalbe sure of reuerence, and therefore it is good a little to be familiar. He that is too much in any thing, so that he giue another occasion of satiety, maketh himselfe cheape. To apply ones selfe to others is well, so it be with demonstration that a man doth it vpon regard,

not vpō facility. It is a good precept generally in seconding [illegible]; yet to adde somewhat of [illegible] if you will graunt his opinion, [illegible] with some distinction. If you will follow his motion: let it be with condition: if you allow his counsell, let it be with alledging further reason.

Of followers and friends.

COstly followers are not to be liked, least while a man maketh his trayne lōger, he make his wings shorter: I reckon to bee costly, [illegible] the alone which charge the [illegible] which are wearisome and [illegible] in sutes. Ordinary following [illegible] to challenge no higher condition then countenance, recommendation and protection from wrong.

[illegible] followers are worse to be liked, which follow not vpon [illegible]

on to him with whom they range
thẽselues, but vpon discontentment
conceiued against some other, wher-
vpon commonly insueth that ill in-
telligence that wee many times
between great personages. The fol-
lowing by certain States answerable
to that which a great person him-
selfe professeth, as of fouldiers to him
that hath been imploied in the wars,
and the like hath euer beene a thing
ciuil, and wel taken euen in Monar-
chies, so it bee without too much
pompe or popularity. But the most
honorable kind of following is to be
followed, as one that apprehendeth
to aduance vertue and desert in all
sorts of persons, & yet wher there is
no eminent oddes in sufficiency, it is
better to take with the more passa-
ble, then with the more able. In go-
uernment it is good to vse men of
one ranke equally, for to conuene-
nance some extraordinarily, is to
make them insolent, and the rest dis-

content, because they may claime a due. But in fauours to [illegible] men with much difference & election, is good, for it maketh the persons preferred more thankful, and the rest more officious, because all is of fauour. It is good not to make too much of any man at first, because one cãnot hold out that proportiõ. To be gouerned by one is not good, & to be distracted with many is worse: but to take aduise of friends is euer honorable: *For lookers on many times see more then gamesters, & the vale best discouereth the hill.* There is litle frindship in the world, & least of all between equals, which was wont to bee magnified. That that is, is between superior and inferiour, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other.

Of Sutors.

Any ill matters are vndertaken, and manye good matters, with ill mindes. Some em-

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brace Suites, whichsoeuer may be for
deale effectually in them. But if he
see there may be life in the matter by
some other meane, they will be con
tent to win a thank, or take a second
reward. Some take hold of suites, only
for an occasion to crosse some other,
or to make an information, whereon
they could not otherwise haue an ap
pretext, without care what become of
the suite, when that turn is serued. Nay
some vndertake suites with a full pur
pose to let the fall, to the end to gra
tifie the aduers party or competitor.
Surely there is in sort a right in euery
suite, either a right of equity, if it be a
suite of controuersie: or a right of de
sert, if it be a suite of petition. If affec
tion lead a man to fauour the wrong
side in Iustice, let him rather vse his
countenance to compound the mat
ter then to carry it. If affection lead a
man to fauor the lesse worthy in de
sert, let him do it without depraui

for disabling the better deseruer. In
sutes a man doth not well vnderstād,
it is good to refer them to som frend
of trust & iudgment, that may report
whether he may deale in them with
honour. Sutors are so distasted with
delaies & abuses, that plaine dealing
in denying to deale in sutes at fyrst,
and reporting the successe barely, &
in challenging no more thanks then
one hath deserued, is grown not on-
ly honourable, but also gracious. In
sutes of fauor the first cōming ought
to take litle place, so far forth consi-
deration may be had of his trust that
of inteligence of the mater could not
otherwise haue been had but by him,
aduantage be not taken of the note.
To be ignorant of the value of a sute
is simplicity, as well as to be ignorant
of the right thereof is want of consci-
ence. Secrecy in sutes is a great mean
of obtaining, for voycing them to
bee in forwardnesse, may discourage

some kind of futors, but doeth quicken and awake others. But tyming of the sutes is the principal, tyming [illegible] say not onely in respect of the person that should grant it, but in respect of those which are like to crosse it. Nothing is thought so easie a request to a great person, as his letter, and yet if it bee not in a good cause, it is so much out of his reputation.

Of Expence.

RIches are for spending, and spending for honour and good actions. Therfore extraordinary expence must bee limited by the worth of the occasion, for voluntary vndoing may be as well for a mans countrey as for the kingdome of heauē. But ordinary expence ought to be limited by a mans estate, and gouerned with [illegible] regard, as it be within his compass

and not subiect to deceite and abuse of seruants, and ordered to the best shew, that the billes may be lesse then the estimation abroad. It is no baseuesse for the greatest to discend and looke into their owne estate. Some forbear it not vpō negligence alone, but doubting to bring themselues into melancholy, in respect they shal find it broken. *But wounds cannot bee cured without searching.*

He that cannot looke into his own estate, he need both chuse wel those whom he employeth, yea and change them often. For newe are more timerous and lesse subtle. In clearing of a mans estate he may as well hurt himselfe in being too suddaine, as in letting it run on too long, for hasty selling is commonly as disadvantageable as interest. He that hath a state to repaire may not dispise small things; and cōmonly it is lesse dishonorable to abridge petty charges, then to

stoup to petty gettings. A man ought warily to begin charges, which once begun, must continue. But in matters that return not, he may be more magnificent.

Of Regiment of health.

Here is a wisedome in this, beyond the rules of Physicke. A mans owne Observation what hee finds good of, and what he findes hurt of, is the best Physicke to preserve health. But it is a safer conclution to say, This agreeth not well with mee, therefore I will not continue it, then this, I finde no offence of this, therefore I may vse it. For strength of nature in youth passeth over many excesses, which are owing by a man til his age. Discerne of the comming on of yeares, and think not

not to doe the same things still. Be-
ware of any suddaine change in any
great point of dyet, and if necessity
enforce it, fit the rest to it. To be free
minded and chearefully disposed at
houres of meate, and of sleepe, and
of exercise is the best precept of long
lasting. If you fly phisick in health al-
together, it will be too straunge to
your body when you shall need it. If
you make it too familiar it wil work
no extraordinary effect when sickness
commeth. Despise no new accident
in the body, but aske opinion of it. In
sickness respect health principallie,
and in health action. For those that
put their bodies to endure in health,
may in most sicknesses which are not
very sharpe, be cured onely with diet
and tendring. Physitians are some of
them so pleasing and comfortable to
the humors of the patient, as they
presse not the true cure of the Dis-
ease; and some other are so regular in

pro-

proceeding according to art, for the diſeaſe, as they reſpect not ſufficiently the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or if it may not be found in one man, compound two of both ſortes, and forget not to call as well the beſt acquainted with your body, as the beſt reputed of for his faculty.

Of Honour and reputation.

THe winning of honor is but the reuealing of a mans vertue and worth without diſaduantage, for ſome in their actions doe affect Honour and reputation, which ſorte of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly litle admired: and ſome darken their vertue in the ſhew of it, ſo as they be vnder-valued in opinion. If a man perform that which hath not beene attempted before, or attempted

tempted & giuen ouer, or hath been atchiued, but not with ſo good circumſtance, hee ſhall purchaſe more honor, then by effecting a matter of greater difficulty or vertue, wherein he is but a follower. If a man ſo temper his actions as in ſome one of thē he do content euery faction or combination of people, the Muſicke will be the fuller. A man is an ill huſband of his honor that entreth into any action the failing wherin may diſgrace him more, then the carrying of it through can honor him. Diſcreet followers help much to reputation. Enuy which is the cāker of honor is beſt extinguiſhed by declaring a mans ſelfe in his endes, rather to ſeeke merite then fame, and by attributing a mans ſucceſſes rather to deuine prouidence and felicity, then to his vertue or policy.

The true Marſhalling of the degrees of Soueraigne Honour are theſe

theſe. In the firſt plaee are *Conditores*, founders of ſtates. In the ſeconde place are *Legiſlatores*, Law-gyuers, which are alſo called ſecond Founders, or *Perpetui principes*, becauſe they gouern by their ordinances after they are gone. In the third place, are *Liberatores*, ſuch as compounde the long miſeries of ciuil wars, or deliuer their Countries from ſeruitude of ſtrangers or tyrants. In the fourth place are *propagatores*, or *propugnatores imperit*, ſuch as in honorable wars inlarge their teritories, or make Noble defence againſt inuaders. And in the laſt place are *Patres patriæ*, which raigne iuſtly, and make the times good wherein they liue. Degrees of honor in ſubiects are firſt. *Participes curarum*, thoſe vpon whom princes do diſcharge the greateſt weight of their affaires, their *Right hands* (as we call them.) The next, are *Duces belli*, great leaders, ſuch as are Princes

Lieu-

Lieutenants, and doo them notable ſeruices in the warres. The third are *Gratioſi*, fauorites, ſuch as exceed not this ſcantling to be ſolace to the Soueraigne, and harmles to the people. And the fourth *Negotijs pares*, ſuch as haue great place vnder Princes, and execute their places with ſufficiency.

Of Faction.

MAny haue a newe Wiſedome indeed, a fond opinion: That for a prince to gouerne his eſtate, or for a great perſon to gouerne his proceedings according to the reſpectes of Factions, is the principall part of policy. Whereas contrariwiſe, the chiefeſt wiſedom is either in ordering thoſe things which are generall, and wherein men of ſeueral factions do neuertheles agree, or in dealing with Correſpondence

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to particuler perſons one by one. But I ſay not that the conſideration of Factions is to be neglected.

Meane men muſt adheare, but great men that haue ſtrength in themſelues were better to maintain themſelues indifferent and naturall, yet euen in beginners to adheare ſo moderately, as hee be a man of the one faction, which is paſſableſt with the other, commonly giueth beſt way.

The lower and weaker Faction is the firmer in coniunction.

When one of the Factions is extinguiſhed, the remaining ſubdiuideth, which is good for a ſecond. It is commonly ſeene, that men once placed, take in with the contrary faction to that by which they enter.

The traitor in factions lightly goeth away with it, for when matters haue ſtucke long in ballancing, the winning of ſome one man caſteth them, and he getteth all the thanks.

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

IT is generally better to deale by ſpeech then by letter, and by the mediation of a third then by a mans ſelfe. Letters are good when a man would draw an aunſwere by Letter backe againe, or when it may ſerue for a mans iuſtification afterwards to produce his owne Letter. To deale in perſon is good, when a mans face breedes regard, as commonly with inferiors. In choyce of inſtrumentes, it is better to chuſe men of a playner ſorte that are like to doe that that is committed to them, and to report backe againe faithfully the ſucceſſe, then thoſe that are cũning to contriue out of other mens buſines ſomewhat to grace themſelues, and will help the matter in reporte for ſatisfactions ſake.

It is better to founde a perſon with

with whom one deales a far off, then to fall vpon the point at firſt, except you meane to ſurpriſe him by ſome ſhort queſtion. It is better dealing with men in apetite, then with thoſe which are where they would be. If a man deale with another vpon conditions, the ſtart or firſt performance is al, which a man cannot reaſonably demand, except either the nature of the thing be ſuch which muſt go before, or elſe a man can perſwade the other party that he ſhal ſtil need him in ſome other thing, or els that he be counted the honeſter man. All practiſe is to diſcouer or to worke: men diſcouer themſelues in truſt, in paſſion, at vnwares, & of neceſſity, when they would haue ſomwhat done, and cannot finde an apt pretext. If you would work any man, you muſt either know his nature and faſhions, & ſo lead him; or his ends, and ſo with him; or his weakneſſe or diſaduanta-

ges

ges, and ſo awe him, or thoſe that
haue intereſt in him, and ſo gouerne
him. In dealing with cunning per-
ons wee muſt euer conſider their
nds to interpret their ſpeeches, and
t is good to ſay little to them, and
hat which they leaſt looke for.

Meditationes ſacræ.

OF the workes of God and man.
Of the miracles of our Saviour.
Of the innocencie of the Done
and the wiſedome of the Serpent.
Of the exaltation of Charity.
Of the moderation of Cares.
Of earthly hope.
Of Hypocrites.
Of Impoſters.
Of the ſeuerall kindes of Impoſture.
Of Atheiſme.
Of Hereſies.
Of the Church and the ſcriptures.

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God beheld all things which his hands had made, and loe they were all passing good. But when man turned him about, and tooke a view of the workes which his handes had made, he found all to be vanity and vexation of spirit: wherefore if thou shalt worke in the works of God, thy sweat shalbe as an oyntment of odours, and thy rest as the Sabbaoth of God. Thou shalt trauaile in the sweat of a good conscience, and shall keepe holy day in the quietnesse and liberty of the sweetest contemplations. But if thou shalt aspire after the glorious actes of men, thy working shall be accompanied with compunction and strife, and thy remembrance followed with distaste and vpbraidings, and iustly doeth it come to passe towards thee (O man)

that

that ſince thou which art Gods work doeſt him no reaſon in yeelding him well pleaſing ſeruice, euen thine owne works alſo ſhould reward thee with the like fruit of bitterneſſe.

Of the miracles of our Sauiour.

He hath done all things well.

A True confeſſion and applauſe: God when he created all things, ſaw that euery thing in particular, and all things in generall were exceeding good, God the word in the miracles which he wrought (now euery miracle is a new creation and not according to the firſt creation) would doe nothing which breathed not towards men fauour and bountye. *Moyſes* wrought Miracles and ſcourged the Egiptians with manye plagues. Elyas wrought Myracles and ſhutte vppe heauen that no

raine ſhould fall vpon the earth, and
againe brought downe from heauen
the fire of God vpon the captaines and
their bands. Elizeus wroght alſo and
called Bears out of the deſart to de-
uoure young Children. Peter ſtroke
Ananias the ſacrilegious hypocrite
with preſent death, and Paule, Elimas
the ſorceror with blindenes, but no
ſuch thing did Ieſus, the ſpirit of God
diſcended downe vppon him in the
forme of a Doue, of whome he ſaide,
You know of what ſpirit you are. The
ſpirit of *Ieſus* is the ſpirit of a Doue,
thoſe ſeruants of god were as the Ox-
en of God treading out the corn and
trampling the ſtrawe downe vnder
their feete, but *Ieſus* is the Lambe of
God without wrath or iudgements.
All his miracles were conſumate a-
bout mans body, as his doctrine re-
ſpected the ſoule of man. The body
of man needeth theſe things: fuſte-
nance, defence from outward wrongs,

and

and medicine, it was hee that drew a multitude of fishes into the nets that he might giue vnto men more liberall prouision. He turned water a lesse worthy nourishment of mans body, into wine a more worthy, that glads the heart of man. He sentenced the Fig-tree to wither for not doing that dutye where-unto it was ordained, which is to beare fruit for mens food. He multiplyed the scarsitye of a few loaues & fishes to a sufficiency to victtuall anhost of people. He rebuked the winds rhat threatned destruction to the seafaring men: he restored motion to the lame, light to the blinde, speech to the dumbe, health to the sick, cleannes to the leaprous, a right minde to those that were possessed, & life to the dead. No miracle of his is to be found to haue been of iudgement or reuenge, but all of goodnesse and mercy, and respecting mans body: for as touching riches he did not

vouchsafe to do any miracle, saue one onely that tribute might be giuen to *Caesar*.

Of the innocency of the Doue, and wisedome of the Serpent.

The foole receiueth not the word of wisedome, except thou discouer to him what he hath in his heart.

TO a man of a peruerse and corrupt iudgement all instruction or perswasion is fruitlesse and contemptible, which beginnes not with discouery, and laying open of the distemper and ill complexion of the minde, which is to be recured as a plaister is vnseasonably applyed before the wound bee searched: for men of corrupt vnderstanding that haue lost al sound discerning of good and euill, come possest with this preiudicate opinion, that they thinke

hink all honeſty and goodnes pro-
eedeth out of a ſimplicity of man-
ners, & a kind of want of experience
nd vnacquaintance with the affaires
of the world. Therefore except they
may perceiue that thoſe things which
re in their hearts, that is to ſay, their
own corrupt principles, & the deepeſt
reaches of their cunning & rottennes
o be throughly ſounded & known to
im that goes about to perſwade with
hē they make but a play of the words
of wiſedome. Therefore it behooueth
im which aſpireth to a goodnes (not
etired or particular to himſelfe, but
a fructifieng and begetting goodnes,
which ſhould drawe on others) to
know thoſe points, which he called
n the reuelation the deeps of Sathan.
That he may ſpeak with authority and
rue inſinuation. Hence is the precept:
Try al things and hold that which is good,
which indureth a diſcerning election
out of an examination whence no-

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thing at all is excluded, out of the ſame fountain ariſeth that direction *Be you wiſe as ſerpẽts, & innocẽt as doues.* There are neither teeth nor ſtings, nor venime, nor wreaths and fouldes of ſerpents which ought not to be all known, & as far as examination doth lead, tryed: neither let any man here feare infection or pollution, for the ſun entreth into ſinkes and is not defiled. Neither let any man think that herein he tempteth God, for his diligence and generality of examination is commanded, and *God is ſufficient to preſerue you immaculate and pure.*

Of the exaltation of Charitie.

If I haue reioyced at the ouerthrow of him that hated me, or tooke pleaſure when aduerſity did befall him.

The deteſtation or renouncing of Iob.

For a man to loue againe where he is loued, it is the charity of Publi-

cans

cans contracted by mutuall profite, and good offices, but to loue a mans enimies is one of the cūningeſt points of the law of Chriſt, and an imitation of the diuine nature. But yet again of this charity there bee diuers degrees, whereof the firſt is, to pardon our enemies when they repent: of which charity there is a ſhadow and image, euen in noble beaſts: for of Lyons it is a receiued opinion, that their fury and fierceneſſe ceaſeth towards any thing that yeeldeth and proſtrateth it ſelfe. The ſecond degree is to pardon our enemies, though they perſiſt, without ſatisfactions and ſubmiſſions. The third degree is, not onely to pardon, and forgiue, & forbeare our enemies, but to deſerue well of them, and to do them good. But all theſe three degrees either haue or may haue in them a certain brauery and greatnes of the mind, rather then pure Charity: for when a man perceiueth vertue to proceed

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ceed and flow from himself, it is possible that he is puffed vppe and takes contentment rather in the fruit of his own vertue, then in the good of his neighbors: but if any euill ouertake the enemy from any other coast, then from thy self, and thou in the inwardest motions of thy hart beest grieud and compassionate, & dost no waies insult, as if thy daies of right and reuenge were at the last come. This I interpret to be the height and exaltation of Charity.

Of the moderation of cares.

Sufficient for the day is the euill thereof.

THere ought to be a mansure in worldly cares, otherwise they are both vnprofitable, as those which oppresse the mind and astonish the iudgment, and prophane

hane as thoſe which ſauour of a
minde which promiſeth to it ſelfe a
ertaine perpetuity in the things of
his world: for we ought to be daies-
men, and not to morrows-men, con-
idering the ſhortnes of our time, and
s he ſaith: *Laying holde on the preſent*
ay: for future thinges ſhall in their
urnes become preſent: therefore
he care of the preſent ſufficeth: and
et moderate cares (whether they
oncerne our particular or the com-
non wealth, or our freindes) are not
lamed. But herein is a twofold ex-
es, the one when the chain or thred
f our cares extended and ſpun out
o an ouer great length, and vnto
mes too far off, as if we could bind
e diuine prouidence by our proui-
ons, which euen with the heathen
as alwaies found to be a thing in-
olent and vnlucky, for thoſe which
id atribute much to fortune, & were
eady at hand to apprehend with ala-

crity

crity the preſent occaſions, haue for the moſt part in their actions been happy. But they who in a compaſſe wiſedome haue entred into a confidence that they had belaied al euenrs haue for the moſt part encountered misfortune. The ſecond exceſſe is when wee dwell longer in our care then is requiſite for due deliberating or firme reſoluing: for who is there amongſt vs that careth no more then ſufficeth either to reſolue of a courſe or to conclude vpon an impoſſibility, and doth not ſtill chewe ouer the ſame things, and tread a maze in the ſame thoughts, and vaniſheth in them without iſſue or concluſion: which kinde of cares are moſt contrary to all diuine and humaine reſpects.

Better is the ſight of the eye, then the apprehenſion of the minde.

PVre ſence receiuing euery thing according to the naturall impreſſion makes a better ſtate and gouernment of the minde then theſe ſame maginations and apprehenſions of he mind: for the minde of man hath his nature and property, euen in the graueſt and moſt ſetled wits, that from he ſence of euery particular, it doth s it were bound and ſpring forward, nd take holde of other matters, foreelling to it ſelfe that all ſhall prooue ike vnto that which beateth vpon he preſent ſence: if the ſence bee of ood, it eaſilie runnes into an vn-limnited hope, and into a like feare; vhen the ſence is of euill, according s is ſaid.

The oracles of hopes doth oft abuſe.

And

And that contrary,

A froward ſouthſayer is feare in doubts

But yet of feare there may be made ſome vſe, for it prepareth patience and awaketh induſtry.

No ſhape of il; comes now or ſtrange to me
Al ſorts ſet down, yea and prepared be

But hope ſeemeth a thing altogether vnprofitable, for to what end ſerueth this conceit of good. Conſider and note a little if the good fall out leſſe then thou hopeſt, goode though it be, yet leſſe becauſe it is, it ſeemeth rather loſſe then benefite through thy exceſſe of hope: if the good prooue equal and proportionable in euent to thy hope, yet the flower thereof by thy hope is gathered, ſo as when it comes, the grace of it is gone, and it ſeems vſed, and therefore ſooner draweth on ſaciety: admit thy ſucceſſe prooue better then thy hope, it is true a gaine ſeemes to be made: but had it not bene better to haue

haue gained the principall by hoping for nothing then the increaſe by hoping for leſſe. And this is the operation of hope in good fortunes, but in miſfortunes it weakneth all force and vigor of the mind: for neither is there alwaies matter of hope, and if there be, yet if it faile but in part, it dooth wholy ouerthrow the conſtancy and reſolution of the mind, and beſides hough it doth carry vs through, yet is a greater dignity of minde to beare euils by fortitude & iudgment, hen by a kind of abſenting and alination of the mind from things preent to things future, for that it is to ope. And therefore it was much ghtneſſe in the Poets to faigne hope o be as a counter poyſon of humaine iſeaſes, as to mittigate and aſſwage he fury and anger of them, whereas deed it doth kindle and inrage the, causeth both doubling of them and lapſes. Notwithſtanding we ſee that

the grea-

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greateſt number of men giue themſelues ouer to their imaginations o hope & apprehenſions of the minde, in ſuch ſort that vngratefull towards things paſt, and in a manner vnmindfull of things preſent, as if they were euer children and beginners, they are ſtill in longing for things to come. *ſaw al men walking vnder the ſun, reſort & gather to the ſecond perſon, which wa afterwards to ſucceede, this is an euill di ſeaſe and a great idleneſſe of the mind.*

But perhaps you will aske th queſtion, whether it bee not bette when things ſtand in doubtful terms to preſume the beſt, and rather hop wel, then diſtruſt, ſpecially ſeeing tha hope doth cauſe a greater ttanquillit of mind.

Surely I do iudge a ſtate of mind which in all doubtfull expectations ſetled & floteth not, and doth this o of a good gouernment and compoſition of the affections, to be one

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the principall ſupports of mans life: But that aſſurance and repoſe of the mind, which onely rides at ancor vpon hope. I do reiect as wauering and weak, not that it is not conuenient to foreſee & preſuppoſe out of a ſound & ſober coniecture as well the good as the euil, that therby we may fit our actions to the probabilities and likelihods of their euent, ſo that this be a worke of the vnderſtanding & iudgmēt, with a due bent and inclination of the affectiō: but which of you hath ſo kept his hopes within limites, as when it is ſo, that you haue out of a watchfull and ſtrong diſcourſe of the mind ſet downe the better ſucceſſe to be in apparancy the more likely, you haue not dwelt upon the very muſe & forethought of the good to come, and giuing ſcope and fauour to your mind, to fall into ſuch cogitations as into a pleaſant dreame: and this it is which makes the minde light, frothy,

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vnequall and wandering: wherefore all our hope is to be beſtowed vpon the heauenly life to come. But heere on earth the purer our ſence is from the infection and tincture of imagination, the better and wiſer ſoule.

The ſumme of life to little doth amount.

And therefore doth forbid a longer count.

Of Hipocrites.

I demaund mercy and not ſacrifice.

ALl the boaſting of the hipocrit is of the works of the firſt Table of the law, which is of odoration and duty towarde God: whereof the reaſon is double both becauſe ſuch works haue a greter pompe and demonſtration of holines, and alſo becauſe they do leſſ croſſe their affections and deſire there

therefore the way to conuict Hipocrits, is to ſend them from the works of ſacrifice to the works of mercy, whence commeth that ſaying.

This is pure and imaculate religion with God the father, to viſit Orphanes and Widdowes in their tribulations. And that ſaying: *He that loueth not his brother whom he hath ſeene, how can he loue God whom he hath not ſeene.*

Now there is another kind of deeper and more extrauagant hipocriſie: for ſome deceiuing themſelues, and thinking thẽſelues worthy of a more neere aeceſſe and conuerſation with god, do neglect the duties of charity towards their neighbour, as inferior matters, which did not indeed cauſe originally the beginning of a monaſticall life (for the beginnings were good) but brought in that exceſſe and abuſe which are followed after: For it is truely ſaide, *That the Office of praying is a great Office in the*

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Church. And it is for the good of the Church, that there be consorts of mẽ freed from the cares of this world who may with daily and deuout supplications and obseruances solicite the diuine Maiesty, for the causes of the Church. But vnto this ordinance that other hipocrisie is a nigh neighbour, neither is the generall institution to be blamed, but those spirites which exalt thẽselues too high to be refrained: for euen *Enoch* which was said to walke with god, did prophesie, as is deliuered vnto vs by Iude, & did indow the Church with the fruit of his prophesie which he left: and Iohn Baptist, vnto whom they did refer as to the author of a monastical life, trauaild & exercised much in the ministry both of prophesie & baptizing, for as to these others who are so officious towardes God, to them belongeth that question: *If thou doe iustly what is that to God or what profit doth*

doth he take by thy hands? Wherefore the works of mercy are they which are the works of diſtinction, whereby to finde out Hipocrites. But with Heretikes it is contrary, for as hipocrites with their diſſembling holyneſſe towards God, doe palliate and couer their iniuries towards men: ſo Heritikes by their morality and honeſt carriage towards men, inſinuate and make a way for their blaſphemies againſt God.

Of Impoſtors.

Whether we be tranſported in mind it is to Godward.
Or whether we be ſober it is to youward.

THis is the true image and true Temper of a man and of him that is Gods faithfull workeman, his carriage and conuerſation towards God is full of

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paſſion, of zeale and of tramiſſes, thence proceed grones vnſpeakable, and exultings, likewiſe in comfort, rauiſhment of ſpirit and agonies. But contrariwiſe his cariage and conuerſation towards men is ful of mildnes ſobriety, and applyable demeanor. Hence is that ſaying, *I am become all things to all men*, and ſuch like. Contrary it is with Hipocrits and Impoſtors, for they in the Church and before the people ſet themſelues on fire, and are carried as it were out of themſelues, and becomming as men inſpired with holy furies, they ſee heauen and earth together: but if a man did ſee their ſolitary and ſeperate meditations, vnd conuerſation where-unto God is onely priuy, he might towards God finde them not onely colde and without vertue, but alſo full of ill nature, and leauen: *Sober enough to God, and tranſportsd on*

Of the ſeuerall kiuds of Impoſture.

Auoid prophane ſtrangenes of wordes and opoſitions of knowledge, falſely ſo called.

Auoid fond and idle fables:

Let no man deceiue you by high ſpeech:

THere are three formes of ſpeaking, which are as it were the ſtile and phraſe of impoſture: the firſt kind is of them, who as ſoone as they haue gottē any ſubiect or matter, do ſtraight caſt it into an Art, inuenting new termes of art, reducing all into diuiſions and diſtinctions, thence drawing aſſertions or poſitions, and ſo framing oppoſitions by queſtions and anſweres. Hence yſſueth the copwebs & clatterings of the Scooleimen.

The ſecond kinde is of them, who

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who, out of the vanity of their wit (as Church Poets) do make and deuiſe all variety of tales, ſtories, and examples, whereby they may leade mens mindes to a beliefe, frō whence did growe the Legendes and infinite fabulous inuentions and dreames of the antient Heretikes.

The third kind, is of them, who fill men's eares with miſteries, high parables, Allegories, and illuſions: which miſticall and profound forme many of the heretikes alſo made choiſe of. By the firſt kind of theſe, the capacity and wit of man is fettered and entangled: by the ſecond it is trayned on and inueigled: by the third it is aſtoniſhed and enchanted, but by eurry of them the while it is ſeduced and abuſed

The foole hath ſaid in his heart there is no God.

Irſt it is to be noted that the Scripture ſaith, the foole hath ſaide in his hart; and not thought in his hart, that is to ſay, he doth not ſo fully thinke it in iudgement, as he hath a good will to be of that beliefe, for ſeeing it makes not for him that there ſhould be a God, he doth ſeeke by all meanes accordingly to perſwade and reſolue himſelfe, and ſtudies to affirme, proue & verifie it to himſelfe as ſome theame or poſition: al which labor, notwithſtanding that ſparkle of our creation light, whereby men acknowledge a Deity, burneth ſtil within, & in vaine doth he ſtriue vtterly to alienate it or put it out, ſo that it is out of the corruption

ruption of his heart and will, and not out of the naturall apprehenſion of his braine & conceit, that he doth ſet down his opiniõ, as the comical poet ſaith: *Then came my mind to be of mine opinion*, as if himſelfe & his mind had been two diuers things: therfore the Atheiſt hath rather ſaid and held it in his heart, then thought or beliued in his hart that there is no god. Secõdly it is to be obſerued, that he hath ſaid in his hart, and not ſpoken it with his mouth. But again you ſhal note, that this ſmothering of this perſwaſion within ỹ hart cõmeth to paſſe for fear of gouernment & of ſpeech amongſt men: for as he ſaith, *To deny God in a publik argumẽt were much, but in a familiar cõference were currant enough.* For if this bridle were remou'd, there is no hereſy which wold cõtend more to ſpred and multiply; & diſſeminate it ſelfe abroad, then atheiſme, neither ſhall you ſee thoſe men, which are

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drencht in this frenſie of minde to breath almoſt any thing els, or to inculcate euen without occaſion, any thing more then ſpeech tending to atheiſme, as may appear in Lucreſias the Epicure, who makes of his inuectiues againſt religion, as it were a burthen or verſe of returue to all his other diſcourſes: the reaſon ſeemes to be, for that the Atheiſt not relying ſufficiently vpon himſelf, floting in mind and vnſatisfied, & induring within many faintings, & as it were fals of his opinion, deſires by other mens opinions agreeing with his, to be recouered and brought againe: for it is a true ſaying.

Who ſo laboureth earneſtly to proue an opiniõ to another, himſelf diſtruſts it

Thirdly, it is a foole that hath ſo ſaide in his heart, which is moſt true, not onely in reſpect that hee hath no taſte in thoſe thinges which are ſupernaturall and dy-

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uine: but in reſpect of humaine and ciuill wiſedome: for firſt of all, if you marke the wits & diſpoſitions which are enclined to Atheiſme, you ſhall finde them light, ſcoffing, impudent, and vaine: briefely, of ſuch a conſtitution, as is moſt contrary to wiſedome and morall grauity. Secondly, amongſt ſtates-men and politiks, thoſe which haue bin of greateſt depths and compaſſe, and of largeſt & moſt vniuerſall vnderſtāding, haue not only in cunning made their profit in ſeeming religious to the people, but in truth haue bin toucht with an inward ſence of the knowledge of Dyetie, as they which you ſhall euermore note to haue attributed much to fortune and prouidence.

Contrariwiſe, thoſe who aſcribed all things to their owne cunnings & practiſes, and to the immediate and apparant cauſes: and as the Prophet ſaith, *Haue ſacrificed to their own nets,*

haue

haue bin alwaies but pretty counterfaite ſtates-men, and not capable of the greateſt actions. Laſtly, this I dare affirme in knowledge of nature, that a little naturall Philoſophy, and the firſt entrance into it, doth diſpoſe the opinion to Atheiſme: But on the other ſide, much natural Philoſophy, and wading deepe into it, wil bring about mens minds to religiō: wherfore Atheiſme euery way ſeemes to be ioyned and combined with folly and ignorance, ſeeing nothing can be more iuſtly alloted to be the ſaying of fooles, then this, *There is no god.*

Of Hereſies.

You erre not knowing the ſcriptures nor the power of God.

THis *cannon* is the mother of al Canons againſt hereſie: The cauſes of errour are two: the ignorance

rance of the will of God, & the igno-
rance or not ſufficient conſideratiõ of
his power, the wil of God is more re-
uealed by the ſcriptures, and there-
fore the precept is, *ſearch the ſcripturs*
the will of God is more reuealed by
the creatures, and therefore the prc-
cept is: *Behold & cõſider the creatures*:
So is the fulnes of the power of God
to be affirmed, as we make no impu-
tation to his wil, ſo is the goodnes of
the will of God to be affirmed, as we
make no derogation from his power:
Therefore true Religion ſeated in
the meane, betwixte ſuperſtition,
with ſuperſtitious Heriſies on the
one ſide, & Atheiſm, with prophane
Hereſies on the other: Superſtition
reiecting the light of the ſcriptures,
and giuing it ſelfe ouer to vngroun-
ded Traditions and writings doubtfu
and not canonicall, or to new reuela-
tions, or to vntrue interpretations o
the ſcriptures, themſelues doth forg
and dream many things of the wil o

God, which are ſtrange & far diſtant from the true ſenſe of the ſcriptures: But Atheiſm and Theomachy rebelleth and mutineth againſt the power of God, giuing no faith to his word, which reuealeth his will, vpon a diſcredit and vnbeliefe of his power, to whom all things are poſſible. Now thoſe hereſies which ſpring out of this fountaine, ſeeme more haynous then the other: for euen in ciuill gouernement it is held an offence in a higher degree, to deny the power and authority of a Prince, then to touch his honour and fame. Of theſe Hereſies which derogate from the power of god beſide plaine Atheiſm, there are 3. degrees, and they haue all one & the ſame miſtery: for al antichriſtianity worketh in a miſtery, that is, vnder the ſhadow of good, & it is this, to free and deliuer the will of God from all imputation and aſperſion of euill. The firſt degree is of

thoſe

thoſe who make and ſuppoſe two principles contrary and fighting one againſt the other, the one of good, the other of euill.

The ſecond degree, is of them to whome the Maieſty of God ſeemes too much wronged, in ſetting vp and erecting againſt him another aduerſe and oppoſite principle, namely ſuch a principle as ſhould be actiue and affirmatiue, that is to ſay, cauſe or Fountaine of any eſſence or being: therefore reiecting all ſuch preſumption, they do neuertheleſſe bring in againſt God, a principle negatiue, and priuatiue, that is a cauſe of not being and ſubſiſting, for they will haue it to be an inbred proper work, and nature of the matter and creature it ſelfe, of it ſelfe to turne againe and reſolue into confuſion and nothing, not knowing that it is an effect of one and the ſame omnipotencie,

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to make nothing of ſomewhat, as to make ſomwhat of nothing. The third degree is of thoſe, who abridge and reſtraine the former opinion only to thoſe humain actions which partake of ſin: which actions, they wil haue to depend ſubſtantiuely and originally, and without any ſequele or ſubordination of cauſes vpon the will, and make, and ſet down, and appoint larger limites of the knowledge of God then of his power, or rather of that part of Gods power (for knowledge it ſelfe is a power whereby he knoweth) then of that by which he moueth and worketh, making him foreknow ſome things idle and as a looker on, which he doth not predeſtinate nor ordaine: Not vnlike to that deuiſe which *Epicurus* brought into *Democritus* opiniõ, to take away deſtiny & make way to Fortune, to wit, the ſtart & ſlip of *Attemus*, which alwaies of the wiſer ſort was reiected as a moſt

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friuolous ſhift. But whatſoeuer depends not of God, as Autor & principle by inferior linkes and degrees, that muſt needes be in place of God, and a new principle, and a certaine vſurping God: wherefore worthely is that opinion refuſed as an indignity and derogation to the Maieſty and power of God, and yet it is moſt truely affirmed, that God is not the author of euill, not becauſe he is not Authour, but becauſe not as of euill.

Of the Church and the Scriptures.

Thou ſhalt protect them in thy Tabernacle, from the contradiction of tongs.

THE contradiction of tongues doeth euery where meete with vs out of the tabernacle of god, therefore whither ſoeuer thou ſhalt turne thy ſelfe, thou ſhalt finde

find no end of controuerſies, except thou withdraw thy ſelfe into that tabernacle. Thou wilt ſay, t'is true and that it is to be vnderſtood of the vnity of the church: but heare and note, there was in the tabernacle the Arke, and in the Arke the teſtimony or tables of the Law: what doeſt thou tel mee of the huske of the tabernacle without the kernel of the teſtimony. The tabernacle was ordained for the keeping and deliuering ouer from hand to hand of the teſtimony. In like manner the cuſtody and paſſing ouer of the ſcriptures is committed vnto the Church, But the life of the tabernacle is the teſtimony.

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OF
The Colours of good and euill, a fragment.



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Cui cetera partes vel ſectæ ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingulæ principatum ſibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quaque ex zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autem ex vero tribuere.

2 Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.

3 Quod ad veritatem refertur maius eſt quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet hæc eſt. Quod quis ſi clam putaret fore facturus non eſſet.

4 Quod rẽ integrã ſeruat bonũ, quod ſine receptu eſt malũ. Nã ſe recipere non poſſe impotentiæ genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.

5 Quòd ex pluribus conſtat, & diuiſibilius eſt maius quám quod expaucioribus & magis vnũ: nam omnia per partes conſiderata maior à vidẽtur: quare & pluralitas partiũ magnitudinẽ præ ſe fert, fortiùs autem operatur pluralitas partiũ ſi ordo abſit, nam inducit ſimilitudinẽ infiniti, & impedit comprehẽſionẽ

6 Cuius

6 *Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.*

7 *Quod bono vicinum bonum, quod a bono remotum, malum.*

8 *Quod quis culpa ſua contraxit, maius malum, quad ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

9 *Quod opera, & virtute noſtra partum eſt, maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortuna delatum eſt, minús bonum.*

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quám gradus diminutionis, & rurſus gradus inceptionis maior videtur, quám gradus incrementi.*

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IN deliberatiues the point is what is good, and what is euill, and of good what is greater, and of euill what is leſſe.

So that the perſwaders labour is to make things appeare good or euill, and that in higher or lower degree, which as it may be performed by true and ſolide reaſons, ſo it may bee repreſented alſo by colours, popularities and circumſtance, which are of ſuch force, as they ſway the ordinary iudgement eyther of a weake man, or of a wiſe man, not

not fully and conſiderately attending and pondering the matter. Beſides their power to alter the nature of the ſubiect in appearance, and ſo to leade to errour, they are of no leſſe vſe to quicken and ſtrengthen the opinions and perſwaſions which are true: for reaſons plainly deliuered, and alwayes after one manner eſpecially with fine and faſtidious mindes, enter but heauily and dully: whereas if they be varied and haue more life and vigor put into them by theſe formes and inſinuations, they cauſe a ſtronger apprehenſion, and many times ſuddaynely win the mind to a reſolution. Laſtly, to make a true and ſafe iudgement, nothing can be of greater vſe and defence to the minde, then

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then the diſcouering and repre-
henſion of theſe colours, ſhew-
ing in what caſes they hold, and
in what they deceiue: which as
it cannot bee done, but out of
a very vniuerſall knowledge of
the nature of thinges, ſo being
performed, it ſo cleereth mans
iudgement and election, as
it is the leſſe apt to
ſlide into any
errour.

A Table of the Colours, or apparances of good and euill, and their degrees, as places of perſwaſion and diſwaſion, and their ſeuerall fallaxes, and the clenches of them.

Cui cetera partes vel ſecta ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingulæ principatum ſibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur, nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autẽ ex vero & merito tribuere.

SO Cicero went about to proue the ſecte of Academiques which ſuſpẽded all aſſeueration, for to be the beſt: for ſaith he, aske a Stoick which philoſophy is true, he wil prefer his own. Then aske him which aprocheth next the truth, wee will confeſſe the Academiques. So deale with the Epicure that will ſcant indure the Stoicke to bee in ſight

ſight of him, ſo ſoone as he hath placed himſelfe, he will place the Academiques next him.

So if a Prince tooke diuers competitors to a place, and examined them ſeuerally, whom next themſelues they would ratheſt commend, it were like the ableſt man ſhould haue the moſt ſecond voices.

The fallex of this colour hapneth oft in reſpect of enuy, for men are accuſtomed after themſelues and their owne faction to incline to them which are ſofteſt, & are leaſt in their way, in deſpight and derogation of them that hold them hardeſt to it. So that this colour of meliority and preheminence is of a ſigne of eneruation and weakneſſe.

2 *Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.*

APpertaining ro this are the formes: *Let vs not wander in generalities:*

ueralities : let vs compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance though it ſeeme of ſtrength, and rather Logicall then Rhetoricall, yet is very oft a fallax.

Sometime becauſe ſome thinges are in kind very caſual, which if they eſcape, proue excellent, ſo that the kind is inferior, becauſe it is ſo ſubiect to peril, but that which is excellent being proued is ſuperior, as the bloſſome of March & the bloſſome of May, wherof ỹ French verſe goeth

Burgeon de Mars enfant de Paris.
Si vn eſchape, iben vant dix.

So that the bloſſome of May is generally better then the bloſſome of March, and yet the beſt bloſſome of March is better then the beſt bloſſome of May. Somtimes becauſe the nature of ſome kindes is to be more equall and more indifferent, aud not to haue very diſtant degrees, as hath been noted in the warmer clymates,

the

the people are generally more wiſe, but in the Northern clymate the wits of chiefe are greater. So in many armies, if the matter ſhould be tried by duell betweene two Champions, the victory ſhold go on the one ſide, and yet if it bee tryed by the groſſe, it would go on the other ſide: for excellencies go as it were by chaunce, but kindes go by a more certaine nature, as by diſcipline in warre.

Laſtly many kindes haue much refuſe, which counteruaile that which they haue excellent, and therefore generally mettall is more precious then Stone, and yet a Diamond is more precious then Gold.

3 *Quod ad veriatem refertur maius eſt quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autẽ & probatio eius quod opinionẽ pertinet, hoc eſt quod quis ſi clam putaret fore, facturus non eſſet*

So

SO the Epicures ſay of the Stoicks felicity placed in vertue. That it is like the felicity of a player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applauſe, he would ſtraight be out of hart and countenance, and therefore they call vertue *Bonum theatrale*. But of riches the Poet ſayth.

Populus me ſibilat,
At mihi plaudo.

And of pleaſure:

Grata ſub imo
Gaudia corde premens, vultu
ſimulate pudorem.

The Fallax of this colour is ſomwhat ſubtile, though the anſwere to the example be ready, for vertue is not choſen *propter auram popularem*. But contrariwiſe, *Maxime omnium teipſum reuerere*, So as a vertuous man will be vertuous in *ſolitudine*, & not onely in *theatro*, though percaſe it will bee more ſtronge by glorye and fame, as an heate which is doubled

bled by reflection: But that denyeth the ſuppoſitiō, it doth not reprehend the fallax, whereof the reprehenſion is a low, that vertue (ſuch as is ioyned with labor & conflict) would not be choſen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not that the chiefe motiue of the election ſhould not be real & for it ſelfe, for fame may be onely *cauſa impulſiua*, & not *cauſa conſtituens*, or *efficiens*. As if there were two horſes, and the one would do better without the ſpur then the other: but againe the other with the ſpur would far exceede the doing of the former, giuing him the ſpur alſo, yet the latter will bee iudged to bee the better horſe, & the forme as to ſay, *Tuſh, the life of this horſe is but in the ſpur*, will not ſerue as to a wiſe iudgement: for ſince the ordinary inſtrumēt of horſemanſhip is the ſpur, and that it is no manner of impediment, nor burden, the horſe is not to be recounted the

leſſe

leſſe of which will not do well without the ſpur, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy then a vertue, ſo glory and honor are the ſpurs to vertue, and although vertue wold languiſh without thē, yet ſince they be alwaies at hand to attend vertue, vertue is not to be ſaid the leſſe choſen for it ſelfe, becauſe it needeth the ſpur of Fame & reputation: and therfore that poſition, *Nota eius rei quod propter opinionem & non propter veritatē eligitur, hæc eſt, quod quis ficta putaret fore facturus non eſſet* is reprehended.

4. *Quod rem integram ſeruat bonum, quod ſine receptu eſt malum. Nam ſe recipere non poſſe impotentia genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.*

HEreof *Aeſope* framed the fable of the two Frogs that conſulted togither in the time of droweth (when many plaſhes that they had repayred to)

were dry what was to be done, and the one propounded to go down into a deep well, because it was like the water would not faile there, but the other answered, yea, but if it do faile, how shall we get it vp againe, And the reasō is, that humane actions are so vncertaine & subiect to perils, as that seemeth the best course which hath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this perswasion the forms are, *you shal ingage your self*, on the other side, *Tantū, quantum voles sumes ex fortuna*, you shal keepe the matter in your own hand. The reprehension of it is, *That proceeding & resoluing in al actions is necessary*: For as he saith wel, *not to resolue, is to resolue*, & many times it breeds as many necessities & ingageth as far in some other sort as to resolue. So it is but the couetous mans disease translated in power, for the couetous man will enioy nothing because he will haue his full

store

ſtore and poſſibility to enioy the more, ſo by this reaſon a man ſhould execute nothing becauſe he ſhould be ſtill indifferent and at liberty to execute any thing. Beſides neceſſity and this ſame *iacta eſt alea* hath many times an aduantage, becauſe it awaketh the powers of the minde, and ſtrengtheneth indeauour, *Cæteris paret neceſſitate certe ſuperiores eſtis.*

5 *Quod ex pluribus cõſtat et diuiſibilius eſt maius quám quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes conſiderata maiora videntur, quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ ſe fert, fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium ſi ordo abſit, nam inducit ſimilitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehenſionem.*

THis colour ſeemeth palpable, for it is not pluralitye of partes without maioritie of parts that maketh the totall greater, yet neuerthe-

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uertheleſſe it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiueth the ſence, as it ſeemeth to the eie a ſhorter diſtance of way if it be all dead and cõtinued, then if it haue trees or buildings, or any other marks, wherby the eie may deuide it. So when a great monied man hath deuided his cheſtes and coines, and bags, he ſeemeth to himſelfe richer then he was, and therfore a way to amplifie any thing, is to break it, & to make anotomy of it in ſeuerall parts, & to examine it according to ſeuerall circumſtances. And this maketh the greater ſhew if it be done without order, for confuſion maketh things muſter more, and beſides what is ſet downe by order and deuiſion doth demonſtrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there, whereas if it be without order both the miude comprehendeth leſſe that which is ſet down, and beſides it leaueth a ſuſpition, as if more

might be ſaid then is expreſſed.

This colour deceiueth, if the mind of him that is to be perſwaded do of it ſelfe ouer conceiue or preiudge of the greatnes of any thing, for thē the breaking of it wil make it ſeeme leſſe becauſe it maketh it appeare more according to the truth, & therefore if a man be in ſickneſſe or paine, the time wil ſeem longer without a clock or houre-glaſſe then with it, for the minde doth value euery moment, and then the hower doth rather ſum vp the moments then deuide the day. So in a dead plaine, the way ſeemeth the longer, becauſe the eie hath preconceiued it ſhorter then the truth: and the fruſtrating of that maketh it ſeeme longer thē the truth. Therfore if any man haue an ouer great opinion of any thing, thē if another think by breaking it into ſeuerall conſiderations, he ſhal make it ſeeme greater to him, he will be deceiued, & ther-

fore in ſuch caſes it is not ſafe to de-
uide, but to extoll the entire ſtill in
generall. Another caſe wherein this
Colour deceiueth is, when the matter
broken or deuided is not cõprehen-
ded by the ſence or made at once in
reſpect of the diſtracting or ſcatte-
ring of it, & being intire and not di-
uided, is cõprehended, as a hundred
pounds in heaps of fiue pounds will
ſhew more thẽ in one groſſe heap, ſo
as the heapes be al vpon one table to
be ſeen at once, otherwiſe not, as flo-
wers growing ſcattered in diuers
beds will ſhew more then if they did
grow in one bed, ſo as all thoſe beds
be within a plot that they be obiect
to view at once, otherwiſe not: and
therfore men, whoſe liuing lyeth to-
gether in one ſhire, are cõmonly coũ
ted greater landed then thoſe whoſe
liuings are diſperſed, though it be
more, becauſe of the notice & com-
prehenſion. A third caſe wherin this

colour

colour deceiueth, & it is not ſo properly a caſe or reprehenſion, as it is a coũter-colour being in effect as large as the colour it ſelfe, & that is, *Omnis compoſito indigentia cuiuſdam videtur eſſe particeps*, becauſe if on thing wold ſerue the turne it were euer beſt, but the defect and imperfectiõs of things hath brought in that helpe to piece thẽ vp as it is ſaid, *Martha, Martha, attendis ad plurima, vnum ſuffieit.* So likewiſe hereupon *Aeſope* framed the fable of the Fox and the Cat, wheras the Fox bragged what a number of ſhifts and deuiſes hee had to gette from the hounds, & the Cat ſaid ſhe had but one, which was to clime a tree, which in proofe was better worth thẽ al the reſt, wherof the prouerb grew, *Multa nouit Vulpes, ſed Felis vnum magnum.* And in the morall of this fable it coms likewiſe to paſſe: That a good ſure friend is a better help at a pinch, then al the ſtratagems

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& pollicies of a mans own wit. So it falleth out to be a common error in negociating, whereas men haue many reasons to induce or perswade, they striue commonly to vtter & vse them all at once, which weakneth them. For it argueth as was said, a needines in euery of the reasons by it selfe, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled frō one to another, helping himselfe onely with that. *Et quæ non prosunt singula multa iuuant.* Indeed in a set speech in an assembly it is expected a man should vse all his reasons in the case he handleth, but in priuate perswasions it is alwaies a great error. A fourth case wherein this colour may be reprehended is, in respect of that same *vis vnita fortior*, according to the tale of the French King, that when the Emperors Ambassador had recited his maisters stile at large, which consisteth of many countries & dominions: the French

King

King willed his Chancellor or other minister to repeate and say ouer France as many times as the other had recited the seuerall dominions, intending it was equiualent with thē all, and beside more compacted & vnited. There is also appertaining to this color an other point, why breaking of a thing doth helpe it, not by way of adding a shew of magnitude vnto it, but a note of excellency and rarity: whereof the formes are, *Where shal you find such a concurrence? Great but not compleate*, for it seemes a lesse worke of nature or fortune to make any thing in his kinde greater then ordinary, then to make a strange cōposition. Yet if it be narrowly considered, this color wil be reprehended or incoūtred by imputing to al excellencies in compositions a kinde of pouerty or at least a casualty or ieopardy, for from that which is excellent in greatnesse somewhat may be taken

taken or there may be decay, and yet ſufficiency leſt, but from that which hath his price in compoſition if you take away any thing, or any part do faile, all is diſgraced.

6 *Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala bonum.*

THe formes to make it conceiued that that was euil which is changed for the better are: *He that is in hel thinks there is no other heauen. Satis quercus, Acorns were good till bread was found. &c.* And of the other ſide, the formes to make it conceiued that that was good which was chaunged for the worſe are, *Bona magis carendo quám fruendo ſentimus: bona à tergo formoſiſſima, Good things neuer appear in their full beauty, till they turne their backe, and be going away. &c.* The reprehenſion of this colour is, that the good or euill which is remoued may be eſteemed good or euill comparitiuely, and not poſitiue-

ſitiuely or ſimply. So that if the priuation be good, it followes not the former condition was euill, but leſſe good, for the flower or bloſſome, is a poſitiue good, although the remoue of it to giue place to the fruit, bee a comparitiue good. So in the tale of *Eſope* when the olde fainting man in the heate of the day caſt downe his burthen and called for death, and when death came to know his will with him, ſaid it was for nothinge, but to helpe him vp with his burthen againe: it doth not followe that becauſe death which was the priuation of the burthen was ill, therefore the burthed was good. And in this part the ordinary forme of *Malum neceſſariũ* aptly reprehendeth this colour, for *priuatio mali neceſſarij eſt mala*, & yet that doth not conuert the nature of the neceſſary euill, but it is euill.

Againe it commeth ſometimes to paſſe, that there is an equaltye

in

in the change of priuation, and as it were a *Dilemma boni*, or a *Dilemma mali*, ſo that the corruption of the one good is a generation of the other, *Sorti pater æquus vtrique eſt:* and contrary the remedy of the one euill is the occaſion and commencement of another, as in *Scilla* and *Charibdis*

7 *Quod bono vicinum, bonum: quod a bono remotum, malum.*

SVch is the nature of things, that things contrary and diſtant in nature and quality are alſo ſeuered and diſioyned in place, and thinges like and conſenting in quality are placed, and as it were quartred together, for partely in regard of the nature to ſpred, multiply, and infect in ſimilitude, and partly in regard of the nature to breake, expell and alter that which is diſagreeable and contrary, moſt

moſt things doe either aſſociate and draw neere to themſelues the like, or at leaſt aſſimilate to themſelues that which approcheth neere them, and do alſo driue away, chaſe, and exterminate their contraries. And that is the reaſon commonly yeelded why the middle Region of the aire ſhould be coldeſt, becauſe the Sun and Stars are either hot by direct beames or by reflection. The direct beames heate the vpper region, the reflected beams from the earth and ſeas heate the lower Region. That which is in the middeſt being furtheſt diſtant in place from theſe two Regions of heate are moſt diſtant in nature that is coldeſt, which is that they tearme cold or hot, *per antiper aſtaſin*, that is, inuironing by contraries, which was pleaſantly taken hold of by him that ſaid that an honeſt man in theſe dai[illegible] muſt needes be more honeſt then in ages heretofore, *propter antiperiſtaſin* becauſe

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becauſe the ſhutting of him in the middeſt of contraries muſt needes make the honeſty ſtronger & more compact in it ſelfe. The reprehenſion of this colour is, firſt many things of amplitude in their kind do as it were ingroſſe to themſelues all, and leaue that which is next them moſt deſtitute, as the ſhootes or vnderwoode that grow neere a great and ſpreade tree, is the moſt pyned and ſhrubbie wood of the field, becauſe the great tree doth depriue and deceiue them of the ſappe and nouriſhment, ſo he ſaith well, *Diuites ſerui maxime ſerui*: and the compariſon was pleaſant of him that compared Courtiers attendant in the Courts of Princes, without great place or office, to faſting daies, which were next the holy-daies but otherwiſe were the leaneſt dayes in all the weeke.

Another reprehenſion is, that things of greatnes & predominancy, though they

they do not extenuate the things adioyning in ſubſtance, yet they drown them and obſcure them in ſhew and appearance, and therefore the aſtronomers ſay, that whereas in all other planets coniunction is the perfecteſt amity: the Sun contrariwiſe is good by aſpect, but euill by coniunction.

A third reprehenſion is, becauſe euill approacheth to good ſometimes for concealment, ſometimes for protection: and good to euill, for conuerſion and reformation. So hypocriſie draweth neere to religion for couert and hiding it ſelfe: *Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni*, and ſanctuary men which were commonly inordinate men, and malefactors, were woont to be neereſt to Prieſtes and prelates and holy men, for the Maieſtie of good thinges is ſuch, as the confines of them are reuered. On the other ſide, our Sauiour charged with neerenes of Publicans and Rioters

ter ſaid, *The Phiſitian aprocheth the ſicke, rather then the whole.*

8 *Quod quis culpa ſua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

THe reaſon is, becauſe the ſtinge and remorſe of the minde accuſing it ſelfe doubleth all aduerſitye: contrariwiſe, the conſidering and recording inwardly, that a man is cleat and free from fault, and iuſt imputation, doth attemper outward calamities. For if the euill be in the ſence and in the conſcience both, there is a gemination of it, but if euill be in the one and comfort in the other, it is a kind of compenſation, ſo the Poets in Tragedies doe make the moſt paſſionate lamentations, and thoſe that forerun finall diſpaire, to be accuſing queſtioning, and torturing of a mans ſelfe.

Seque vnum clamat cauſamque capu

qu

que malorum. And contrariwiſe the extremities of worthy perſons haue beene annihilated in the conſideration of their owne good deſeruing. Beſides, when the euill commeth from without, there is left a kinde of euaporation of griefe, if it come by humane iniurie, either by indignation and meditating of reuenge from our ſelues, or by expecting of foreconceiuing that *Nemeſis* and retribution will take hold of the authors of our hurt, or if it be by fortune or accedent, yet there is left a kinde of expoſtulation againſt the diuine powers. *Atque Deos atque aſtra vocat crudelia mater.*

But where the euil is deriued from a mans owne fault, there all ſtrikes deadly inwards, and ſuffocateth. The reprehenſion of this colour is, firſt in reſpect of hope, for reformation of our faults is in *noſtra poteſtate*, but amendment of our fortune ſimply is

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not. Therfore *Demoſtenes* in many of his orations ſaith thus to the people of *Athens*, *That which hauing regard to the time paſt in the worſt point & circumſtance of all the reſt, that as to the time to come is the beſt: What is that? Euen this, that by your ſlouth, irreſolution, and miſgouernment, your affaires are growne to this declination, & decay. For had you vſed and ordred your means and forces to the beſt, & done your parts euery way to the ful, & notwithſtanding your matters ſhould haue gon backward in this manner as they do, there had been no hope left of recouery or reputatiõ, but ſince it hath been only by our own errors, &c.* So *Epictetus* in his degrees ſaith, *The worſt ſtate of man is to accuſe externe things better then that to accuſe a mans ſelf, & beſt of al to accuſe neither.*

Another reprehenſion of this colour is in reſpect of the well bearing of euils, wherewith a man can charge no body but himſelfe, which maketh them

them the leſſe.

Leue fit quod bene fertur onus.

And therefore many natures, that are either extreamely proud, and wil take no fault to themſelues, or elſe very true, and cleauing to themſelues (when they ſee the blame of any thing that fals out ill muſt light vpon themſelues) haue no other ſhift but to beare it out well, and to make the leaſt of it, for as we ſee when ſometimes a fault is cõmitted, and before it be knowne, who is to blame much adoe is made of it, but after if it appeare to be done by a ſon, or by a wife, or by a neere friend, then it is light made of. So much more when a man muſt take it vpon himſelfe. And therefore it is commonly ſeene that weomen that marry husbands of their owne chuſing againſt their friends conſents, if they be neuer ſo ill vſed, yet you ſhall ſeldome ſee the complaine, but ſet a good face on it.

9 *Quod opera & vertute noſtra partum eſt maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum eſt minus bonum.*

THe reaſons are firſt the future hope, becauſe in the fauours of others or the good winds of fortune we haue no ſtate or certainty in our indeuours or abilities we haue. So as when they haue purchaſed vs one good fortune, we haue them as ready and better edged and inuironed to procure another.

The formes be, *you haue won this by play, you haue not only the water, but you haue the receipt, you can make it againe if it be loſt, &c.* Next becauſe theſe properties which we inioy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which ſeemeth a kinde of burthen, whereas the other which deriue from our ſelues are like the freeſt parents, *abſque aliquo inde pedendo,*

dendo, and if they proceede from fortune or prouidence, yet they ſeeme to touch vs ſecretly with the reuerence of the diuine powers whoſe fauours we taſt and therfore worke a kind of religious feare and reſtraint, whereas in the other kind, that coms to paſſe, which the Prophet ſpeaketh. *Lætantur & exultans, immolant plagis ſuis, & ſacrificant reti ſuo.*

Thirdly, becauſe that which commeth vnto vs without our owne vertue, yeeldeth not that commendation & reputation, for actions of great felicity may draw wonder, but praiſe-leſſe, as *Cicero* ſaide to *Caſar*, *qua miremur, habemus, qua laudemus expectamus.*

Fourthly, becauſe the purchaſes of our own induſtry are ioyned commonly with labour and ſtrife which giues an edge and appetite and maks the fruition of our deſire more pleaſant. *Suauis cibus à venatu.*

On the other ſide there be fower counter colours to this colour rather then reprehenſions, becauſe they be as large as the colour it ſelfe firſt becauſe felicity ſeemeth to be a character of the fauour and loue of the diuine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in our ſelues and reſpect & authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many caſuall things, whereunto the care or vertue of man cannot extend, and therefore ſeemeth to be at large good, as when *Cæſar* ſaid to the ſayler, *Cæſarem portas et fortunam eius*, if he had ſaid, *& virtutem eius*, it had beene ſmall comfort againſt a tempeſt, otherwiſe then if it might ſeeme vpon merit to induce fortune.

Next, whatſoeuer is done by vertue and induſtry, ſeemes to be done by a kind of habite and art, and therevpon open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicitie is imitable:

ſo

ſo we generally ſee, that things of nature ſeeme more excellent then things of art, becauſe they be imitable: for, *quod imitabile eſt, potentia quadam vulgatum eſt.*

Thirdly felicity commendeth thoſe things which commeth without our owne labour, for they ſeeme gifts, and the other ſeemes peny worthes whereupon *Plutarch* ſaith elegantly of the actes of *Timoleon* who was ſo fortunate, compared with the acts of *Ageſilaus* and *Epaminondas*, *that they were like Homers verſes they ran ſo eaſily and ſo well.* And therefore it is the worde we giue vnto poeſie terming it a happy veine, becauſe facillity ſeemeth euer to come from happineſſe.

Fourthly, this ſame *prater ſpem, vel prater expectatũ*, doth increaſe the price & pleaſure of many things, and this

cannot be incident to thoſe thinges that proceede from our owne care and compaſſe.

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quam gradus diminutionis: & rurſus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quam gradus incrementi.*

IT is a poſition in the Mathematiques that there is no proportion betweene ſomewhat and nothing, therefore the

the degree of nullity and quiddity or act, ſeemeth larger then the degrees of increaſe and decreaſe, as to a monoculous it is more to looſe one eye, then to a man that hath two eyes. So if one haue loſt diuers children, it is more griefe to him to looſe the laſt then all the reſt: becauſe he is *ſpes gregis*, And therefore *Sybilla* when ſhe brought her three bookes, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, becauſe the burning of that had beene *gradus priuationis*, and not *diminutionis*. This colour is reprehended firſt in thoſe things, the vſe and ſeruice whereof reſteth in ſufficiency, competency, or determinate quantity, as if a man be to pay one hundreth pounds vpon a penalty, it is more to him to want xii. pence, then after that xii. pence ſuppoſed to bee wanting to want ten ſhillings more: ſo the decay of a mans eſtate ſeemes

to

to bee moſt touched in the degree when he firſt growes behind, more then afterwards when he proues nothing worth. And hereof the common formes are, *Sera in fundo perſimonia*, and as good neuer a whit, as neuer the better, &c. It is reprehended alſo in reſpect of that notion, *Corruptio vnius, generatio alterius*: ſo that *gradus priuationis* is many times leſſe matter, becauſe it giues the cauſe, & motiue to ſome new courſe. As when *Demoſtenes* reprehended the people for harkning to the cõditions offred by King *Phillip*, being not honorable nor equal, he ſaith they were but elements of their ſloth & weakneſſe, which if they were taken away, neceſſity would teach them ſtronger reſolutions. So Doctor *Hector* was wont to ſaye to the Dames of London when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure

dure to take any Medicine, hee would tell them, their way was onely to be ſicke, for then they would bee glad to take any Medicine.

Thirdly, this colour may be reprehended, in reſpect that the degree of decreaſe is more ſenſitiue, then the degree of priuaſion, for the mind of men, *gratus diminutionis* may worke a wauering betweene hope and feare, and keepe the mind in ſuſpence from ſetling and accomodating in patience, & reſolution: heerof the common formes are, *Better eye out then alwaies ake*, make or mar, &c.

For the ſecond branch of this colour it depends vpon the ſame generall reaſon: hence grew the common place of extoling the beginning of euery thing. *Dimidū facti qui bene cœpit habet*

habet. This made the Aſtrologers ſo idle as to iudge of a mans nature & deſtiny by the conſtellation of the moment of his natiuity, or conception. This colour is reprehended, becauſe many inceptions are but as *Epicurus* tearmeth them, *tentamentæ*, that is, imperfect Offers and aſſaies, which vaniſh and come to no ſubſtance without any iteration, ſo as in ſuch caſes the ſecond degree ſeemes the worthieſt, as the body-horſe in the Carte, that draweth more then the fore-horſe, hereof the common forms are, *the ſecõd blow maks the fray the ſecond word maks the bargain, alter principium dedit, alter modũ abſtulit, &c.* Another reprehenſiõ of this colour is in reſpect of defatigation, which makes perſeuerance of greter dignity then inception, for chance or inſtinct of nature may cauſe inception, but ſetled affection or iudement maketh the continuance,

Thirdly,

Thirdly, this colour is reprehen, ded in ſuch things which haue a naturall courſeand inclination, contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually euacuated and gets no ſtart, but there behooueth *perpetua inceptio*, as in the common forme: *non progredi, eſt regredi, qui non proficit, dificit*, Running againſt the hill: rowing againſt the ſtream, &c. For if it be with the ſtreame or with the hil, then the degree of inception is more then all the reſt.

Fourthly, this colour is to be vnderſtood of *gradus inceptionis à potetia, ad actum comparatus cum gradu ab actu ad incrementũ:* For otherwiſe, *maior videtur gradus ab impotentia ad potentiã, quam a potentia ad actum.*

FINIS.